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Abstract: Traditionally, a scientific model is thought to provide a good scientific explanation to the extent that it 
satisfies certain scientific goals that are thought to be constitutive of explanation (e.g. generating understanding, 
identifying mechanisms, making predictions, identifying high-level patterns, allowing us to control and manipulate 
phenomena). Problems arise when we realize that individual scientific models cannot simultaneously satisfy all the 
scientific goals typically associated with explanation. A given model’s ability to satisfy some goals must always 
come at the expense of satisfying others. This has resulted in philosophical disputes regarding which of these goals 
are in fact necessary for explanation, and as such which types of models can and cannot provide explanations (e.g. 
dynamical models, optimality models, topological models, etc). Explanatory monists argue that one goal will be 
explanatory in all contexts, while explanatory pluralists argue that the goal will vary based on pragmatic 
considerations. In this paper, I argue that such debates are misguided, and that both monists and pluralists are 
incorrect. Instead of any goal being given explanatory priority over others in a given context, the different goals are 
all deeply dependent on one another for their explanatory power. Any model that sacrifices some explanatory 
goals to attain others will always necessarily undermine its own explanatory power in the process. And so when 
forced to choose between individual scientific models, there can be no explanatory victors. Given that no model 
can satisfy all the goals typically associated with explanation, no one model in isolation can provide a good 
scientific explanation. Instead we must appeal to collections of models. Collections of models provide an 
explanation when they satisfy the web of interconnected goals that justify the explanatory power of one another. 
 
What kind of information must a scientific model convey in order to provide a good scientific 
explanation? This question has been at the heart of many recent debates within philosophy of science 
(see, for example: Batterman 2002; Craver 2006; Potochnik 2007, 2010; Weber 2008; Huneman 2010; 
Kaplan & Craver 2011; Lange 2013; Chirimuuta 2014; Rice 2015; Povich 2016). Traditionally, the 
explanatory power of a theory or model in science has been thought to relate to its ability to help us 
satisfy certain kinds of scientific goals. While there are disagreements regarding which goals in particular 
ought to be considered essential for explanation, a list of frequently defended scientific goals include: 
 
(1) Successfully conveying understanding about the target phenomenon, or making it intelligible, to 
an audience or inquirer (Achinstein 1983; Braverman et al. 2012 Waskan et al, 2014). 
(2) Determining when a given phenomenon is expected to occur, and under what conditions 
(Hempel & Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1965; Chemero & Silberstein 2008; Rice 2015). 
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(3) Identifying general principles or patterns that all instances of the explanandum phenomenon 
adhere to and/or constraints that the phenomenon must conform to (Batterman 2001, 2002; 
Weber 2008; Matthewson & Weisberg 2009; Lange 2013; Chirimuuta 2014).1 
(4) Identifying the particular physical mechanisms that generate and sustain the target 
phenomenon (Salmon 1984, 1989; Craver 2006; Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005; Strevens 2008; 
Kaplan & Craver 2011). 
(5) Providing information sufficient to control, manipulate, and reproduce the target phenomenon 
(Woodward 2000, 2003; Eliasmith 2010) 
 
It is the attainment of these scientific goals that are thought to imbue scientific models with explanatory 
power.2 For this reason, I will refer to these as “explanatory goals”. There is psychological evidence that 
each of the above goals is taken to be an essential part of explanation by both scientists and laypeople. 
For example, some psychological studies have shown that scientists are unlikely to consider a model or 
theory explanatory unless it provides understanding (Braverman et al. 2012 Waskan et al, 2014). Others 
have shown that both scientists and laypeople tend to view a theory or model as explanatory when it 
subsumes phenomena under general principles or patterns which can be used for making future 
predictions (Lombrozo and Carey 2006). Meanwhile, others still have shown that identifying 
mechanisms plays an essential role in the way people explain, and is a result of our need to control and 
manipulate the world around us (Keil 2006; Gopnik 2000). Studies suggest that the more of these goals a 
scientific model can satisfy, the more explanatory it is taken to be.  
                                                             
1 These principles can be understood in terms of strict nomological laws, behavioural patterns, broad causal 
regularities, or true generalizations made about the system. 
2
 The list above should by no means be interpreted as an exhaustive inventory of the sorts of scientific goals that 
may be relevant for scientific explanation. Additional goals may well be worth including as well. For the sake of 
brevity and simplicity, I will focus my attention on these five given that these have all been explicitly defended by 
philosophers of science in recent years for their explanatory power. 
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Problems start to arise, however, when we realize that an individual scientific model cannot 
simultaneously satisfy all the scientific goals typically associated with explanation. The ability of a given 
model to satisfy some goals must come at the expense of satisfying others. This has resulted in 
numerous philosophical disputes regarding which of these goals are in fact necessary for scientific 
explanation, and whether a model should count as an explanation given the particular goals that it does 
and does not satisfy. Those engaged in these disputes typical endorse one of two views: either an 
explanatory monism, or an explanatory pluralism. Those who endorse an explanatory monism argue 
that there is one goal in particular that is essential to scientific explanation in all contexts. A model is 
explanatory when it satisfies this goal, and fails to explain when it does not. Others endorse an 
explanatory pluralism. Under this view, satisfying any of these goals may be sufficient to count as an 
explanation under the appropriate pragmatic conditions. 
In this paper, I argue that both accounts are incorrect. Specifically, both assume that a model 
needs to primarily satisfy one of the goals typically associated with explanation in any given context to 
count as explanatory (they simply disagree on which goal this is, and whether the goal varies based on 
pragmatic considerations). In contrast, I propose that there is an essential explanatory interdependence 
between the different goals. The explanatory power of each goal stems, at least in part, from the fact 
that it helps us to more easily satisfy the others. Thus instead of a monism or a pluralism, we have an 
explanatory holism. Given that no one model can satisfy all the goals typically associated with 
explanation, no one model in isolation can provide a good scientific explanation of a complex 
phenomenon. Any scientific model which satisfies some goals at the cost of others will, in doing so, 
undermine the very explanatory power of the model in the process by cutting it off from the other goals. 
Instead, the explanation is distributed across many different models which altogether satisfy the various 
goals needed for the explanation. 
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 In order to make this argument, I begin section one of the paper by demonstrating how an 
individual scientific model can typically only satisfy some explanatory goals at the cost of satisfying 
others, making it impossible for any individual model to attain them all simultaneously. Using the 
application of dynamical models in cognitive science and optimality models in evolutionary biology as a 
guide, I demonstrate in section two how the necessary trade-offs between explanatory goals made by 
such models have led to numerous philosophical disputes regarding their explanatory status. Finally, in 
section three, I argue that the interdependent nature of the different explanatory goals means that such 
debates are largely misguided. No one goal can be shown to have greater explanatory significance or 
priority over others, and so no one model can be seen as explanatory in isolation of others. The holistic 
nature of explanation requires that we employ a range of different models which satisfy different 
explanatory goals in order to grant any of them explanatory power. In this regard, we can dissolve many 
current philosopical disputes about the explanatory status of individual scientific models. 
 
1. Explanatory Goals and Trade-Offs 
 
Suppose we wish to explain why the action potential of a neuron fires the way that it does. A scientific 
model that provides the best possible explanation (i.e. the ideal explanation) is one that: 
 
(1) Will provide us with an understanding of how the action potential fires. 
(2) Will allow us to accurately anticipate when a given action potential will fire given background 
conditions. 
(3) Will allow us to identify general patterns or principles that all action potentials adhere to.  
(4) Will identify the physiological mechanisms that generate the action potential. 
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(5) Will provide information needed to intervene in, inhibit, and reproduce, the firing of the action 
potential. 
 
While this certainly fits with the sorts of things neuroscientists seek in their explanation of the action 
potential, problems start to arise when we consider that it is impossible for any individual scientific 
model to satisfy all of these explanatory goals at the same time. This is because a particular model’s 
ability to satisfy some explanatory goals must come at the expense of satisfying others. 
To illustrate, consider that a model which includes more details about the structures and causes 
that generate the action potential of any particular neuron will not be informative as to whether cells 
with different morphologies and biophysical properties will produce similarly behaving action potentials. 
If we want to identify general principles shared by action potentials in all kinds of cells, then what we 
want is a model that abstracts away from the structural and causal differences that exist between the 
different cells in order to focus on identifying the sorts of principles and patterns that apply to them all. 
Likewise, the reverse will also be true. Identifying general principles that all action potentials conform to 
by itself does not tell us how any particular action potential is generated by the mechanisms of an 
individual cell so as to fit with these general principles. 
One of these explanatory goals requires a high degree of specificity (identifying the workings of 
the particular mechanisms of a particular system), while another requires a high degree of abstraction 
(identifying general principles that many different mechanisms adhere to). A model which is too detailed 
will obscure and obfuscate the general principles or patterns we seek to identify, while a model which is 
too abstract in its characterization of the system will be too course-grained to tell us about the workings 
of the particular mechanisms we seek (for elaboration, see: Levins 1966; Jackson & Pettit 1992; 
Matthewson & Weisberg 2009; Batterman 2001, 2002; Potochnik 2010, 2015). Thus in this case, the 
model must make a trade-off between explanatory goals (3) and (4). 
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As a second example, consider the conflicts that can arise between models which allow for 
manipulation and control, and those which allow for accurate predictions of the explanandum 
phenomenon. Conductance-based models can provide us with a degree of control and manipulation 
over the workings of the action potential by characterizing the system in terms of measurable quantities 
needed for such interventions. This allows us to create models of the action potential that allow for 
direct interventions. However, these measurable quantities can often only be determined by observing 
the firing rates of many different neurons, and then averaging across them. This leads to idealized 
models which often cannot accurately predict the behaviour of actual neurons under experimental 
conditions. As Eugene Izhikevich notes: 
 
The advantage of using conductance-based models, such as the INa+IK-model, is that each 
variable and parameter has a well-defined biophysical meaning. In particular, they can be 
measured experimentally. The drawback is that [...] the parameters are usually measured in 
different neurons, averaged, and then fine-tuned (a fancy term meaning “to make arbitrary 
choices”). As a result, the model does not have the behavior that one sees in experiments. 
(2007, p.267). 
 
In these cases, in order for a scientific model to quantify over the system in such a way that allows us to 
more practically intervene in its workings, it must do so by sacrificing the degree to which it can 
successfully predict the behaviour of any actual real-world system. As a result, these models must make 
a trade-off between explanatory goals (2) and (5). 
 Or consider a similar problem facing any model which attempts to identify the causal 
mechanisms that underlie the firing of the action potential. The underlying mechanisms of a system are 
often influenced by features outside of the system, as well as by events that happened in the distant 
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past. A model which characterizes the mechanisms of a system often must do so by idealizing away from 
the many external and historical influences that can disrupt or alter its behaviour. This means that such 
models are often unable to predict the behaviour of real-world systems since such systems are 
unavoidably influenced by factors not represented in the model (see: Bechtel 2015; Hochstein 2016b). 
And so there will be a trade-off between explanatory goals (2) and (4). 
 These trade-offs are due to numerous factors. Some, like the trade-off between specificity and 
generality, are an unavoidable consequence of the nature of representation (for a detailed explanation 
of why this is the case, see: Matthewson & Weisberg 2009). Other factors are a result of our 
psychological or cognitive limitations. The amount of detail needed to effectively control, manipulate, or 
reproduce sufficiently complex phenomena often comes at the cost of making that phenomenon 
coherent or understandable to us. Thus a trade-off between these goals is often inevitable (for further 
details, see: Potochnik 2015). Levins, for example, argues that this is the case with models in population 
biology (1966, p. 421). In other cases, trade-offs are a result of pragmatic limitations. We have limited 
computational resources available to us when modeling systems at any given time, and so we often 
must choose which goals to satisfy in place of others when computational constraints make satisfying 
multiple explanatory goals impossible. And this problem is not easily remedied given that when it comes 
to scientific modeling, “computational constraints will never be removed, as there are always more 
details that could be simulated” (Eliasmith & Trujilio 2014, p.4). 
 What all this means is that a scientific explanation cannot simply be thought of as any model 
that satisfies all our explanatory goals simultaneously, since this is frequently not possible. So what do 
we do when we have conflicts of this sort? Does sacrificing one explanatory goal (e.g. the ability to 
predict the phenomenon) in order to attain another (e.g., the ability to manipulate the phenomenon) 
make our model more explanatory, or less? Which goals are we permitted to sacrifice while still 
satisfying the conditions needed for a good scientific explanation? In recent years, philosophers have 
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disagreed on exactly this issue, and have emphasized the importance of different sorts of explanatory 
goals. It is to these conflicts that we now turn. 
 
2. Disagreements and Debates 
 
Given that scientific models cannot satisfy all the goals that have typically been associated with 
explanation, recent philosophical disagreements have emerged regarding which goals should be taken 
as genuinely explanatory, and which should not, so as to determine which trade-offs are appropriate. In 
order to illustrate this point, consider the debates that have surrounded the explanatory status of 
dynamical models in cognitive science, as well as those surrounding optimality models in evolutionary 
biology. 
 
2.1 Dynamical models 
 
Many systems in nature are not merely complex, but are constantly in the process of changing. 
Effectively studying such systems in science often requires us to identify, track, and predict when and 
how these changes occur over time. To this end, Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) is a mathematical 
formalism used to characterize the changing behaviour of complex systems over time by employing sets 
of differential equations. The application of this formalism allows us to construct scientific models which 
abstractly represent the system as a vector moving through a multi-dimensional phase space, where the 
different dimensions of the space represent different variables that are relevant to possible states the 
system can occupy. Within these state spaces, there will be certain regions that the trajectory of the 
vector will tend towards or be drawn to. These are often referred to as “attractors”. This type of model 
allows us to map out and predict stable patterns and regularities in the behaviour of the vector moving 
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through the space (and thus to understand the types of possible physical states the actual system is 
likely to be in, and to move towards). Dynamical models are used in science to study a diverse range of 
phenomena, from weather patterns, to the behaviour of fluids, to neural activity.  
Recently, philosophers of science have debated whether or not these types of models can 
provide good scientific explanations, and under what conditions. For a concrete example, consider the 
study of the action potential in the history of neurophysiology. In the 1950s, Alan Lloyd Hodgkin and 
Andrew Huxley developed a mathematical model of the action potential in the squid giant axon which 
characterized the ion flow of its sodium and potassium channels (1952). At the time, the model provided 
previously unknown information regarding electrochemical properties of action potentials. Specifically, 
that the action potential could be understood in terms of sodium and potassium conductances with 
specific voltage and time dependencies. While the model was able to mathematically characterize the 
time and voltage dependencies that were responsible for changes in the electrical potential of the 
axon’s membrane, the model itself remained silent as to the possible mechanisms that might be 
responsible for producing those dependencies (Hodgkin 1992, p.291). 
In the 1960s, Fitzhugh and Nagumo et al took the Hodgkin & Huxley model and modified it to 
create one of the first dynamical models of the action potential (Fitzhugh 1960; Nagumo, Arimoto & 
Yoshizawa 1962). In order to do so, they simplified away many of the variables contained within the 
already abstract Hodgkin & Huxley model to allow for a simpler visualization of the phase space and the 
trajectory of a vector through that space (Ross 2015, p.39). This model allowed scientists to identify 
certain dynamic principles that the action potential adhered to, and allowed scientists to predict the 
behaviour of many different action potentials in different neurons. The question is: does a dynamical 
model like the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model provide a good scientific explanation of the action potential? 
 When it comes to models like the Hodgkin & Huxley model and the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model, 
some have argued that they fail to provide a scientific explanation in virtue of focusing primarily on 
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prediction and failing to identify the causal mechanism responsible for the behaviour of the action 
potential (Bogen 2005; Craver 2006). James Bogen argues that they “do not purport to explain anything. 
They are important because investigators can rely on them to suggest facts to be explained and tactics 
for explaining them” (Bogen 2005, p.405). In other words, by failing to satisfy explanatory goal (4), they 
cannot provide a scientific explanation. Others, meanwhile, argue that these types of models fail to 
explain for different reasons. Specifically, because the abstract and simplified nature of dynamical 
models means that they cannot provide information that is necessary to intervene in, control, or 
reproduce the firing of the action potential. Put simply, the model’s inability to satisfy explanatory goal 
(5) is what keeps it from being explanatory (Eliasmith 2010). 
Some, however, have argued that such models do provide good scientific explanations in virtue 
of satisfying other explanatory goals. Ross argues that dynamical models like the Fitzhugh-Nagumo 
model are explanatory because they “show how different physical systems display the same universal 
behavior” (Ross 2015, p.49). Likewise Weber (2008) notes that the Hodgkin & Huxley model (and by 
extension the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model) provides an explanation in virtue of identifying general 
principles or patterns that all action potentials adheres to; in this case, a general causal regularity 
regarding time/voltage dependencies (2008, p. 1002). Put simply, such models are taken to be 
explanatory because they satisfy explanatory goal (3).  
Next, consider the way that the necessary trade-offs made by dynamical models is relevant to 
these debates.  According to Ross and Weber, the generality of certain models (like the Hodgkin & 
Huxley model and the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model) is what makes the model explanatory. If this is the case, 
then in order to satisfy explanatory goal (3), the model must fail to satisfy explanatory goal (4) since 
abstracting away from the underlying mechanisms is what gives the model the generality it needs to 
identify a regularity or pattern that exists across a range of different cells. In other words, “the 
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superficial model has a nice generality to it, as it applies to very different materials, abstracting from the 
details of their molecular structure. This is what physical explanations often do” (Weber 2008, p. 1005).  
 But what if we tried to modify such a model so that it included the mechanistic details, thereby 
satisfying explanatory goal (4)?  After all, while the variables in a dynamical model often represent high-
level non-physical parameters or abstract behavioural features of systems (as opposed to components 
of mechanisms), they can be amended to include variables which do map directly to particular 
components of a mechanism. Mechanists have argued that when a dynamical model is able to make 
such a mapping, it can satisfy explanatory goal (4) and thus successfully provide a good scientific 
explanation (Kaplan & Craver 2011; Kaplan & Bechtel 2011; Zednik 2011). However, by altering a 
dynamical model to allow for such a mapping, we change the sorts of trade-offs that the dynamical 
model must now make. 
Take the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model. In order for the variables in the model to map to the 
structural features of any one mechanism, the model has to give up the essential generality needed to 
identify features shared by many different neural mechanisms. In this respect, the model must trade off 
(3) in order to satisfy (4). It is also important to recognize that the creation of such a mechanistic 
dynamical model, while being able to satisfying explanatory goal (4), would still be unable to satisfy 
explanatory goal (5). This is because even if the variables in the model map to the physical mechanisms 
of a system, dynamical descriptions are often too abstract to allow for manipulation and control over 
the system’s workings. As Chris Eliasmith argues: 
 
A related consequence of DST’s treatment of lumped parameters is that the mechanisms 
described by DST are highly abstract. […]. Hence, methods of interacting with the system are not 
evident from such models. Without being able to predict the effects of interventions, the 
models become less useful to the brain sciences. (2010, p.319) 
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But suppose we were to modify the model even further so that it not only had variables that mapped to 
a given mechanism, but also provided the relevant sort of information needed to allow for interventions 
as well. In doing so, our model would be able to satisfy both goals (4) and (5), but by adding additional 
parameters to our model we complicate it further and in doing so sacrifice our ability to effectively 
understand the phenomenon. In fact, the very reason that the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model simplifies away 
many of the details of the Hodgkin-Huxley model (which was itself already an abstract description of the 
action potential that did not identify its underlying causal mechanisms) was because such simplifications 
were essential to provide an understanding of the relevant behavioural regularities and patterns 
(Fitzhugh 1960; Ross 2015). Fitzhugh himself justified the simplifying assumptions of the model on the 
grounds that such simplifications lead “to a better understanding of the complete system than can be 
obtained by considering all the variables at once” (Fitzhugh 1960, p.873). Hoppensteadt and Izhikevich 
(1997) make a similar argument, noting that models which include additional physiological details 
needed for manipulation and control can… 
 
…become a trap, since the more neurophysiological facts are taken into consideration during 
the construction of the model, the more sophisticated and complex the model becomes. As a 
result, such a model can quickly come to a point beyond reasonable analysis even with the help 
of a computer. (1997, p. 5) 
 
This means that while the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model satisfies explanatory goals (1) and (3), it cannot 
satisfy (4) and (5). By modifying the model to better satisfy (4), it loses the ability to satisfy (3). And by 
modifying it to better satisfy (5), it loses the ability to satisfy (1). And so the question of whether a 
dynamical model like the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model provides a good scientific explanation depends on 
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which explanatory goal one chooses to emphasize. Different philosophers emphasize the importance of 
different goals, and so disagree as to which sorts of dynamical models provide explanations, and under 
what conditions. 
 
2.2. Optimality Models 
 
Let us consider a second example to further illustrate. Consider the use of optimality models in 
evolutionary biology. Optimality models employ a particular kind of mathematical technique known as 
Optimality Theory in order to understand and predict the appearance of phenotypic traits in a given 
population. Put simply, such models treat natural selection as if it were the only causal force in the 
evolutionary process, and then determine what the most locally optimal trait for a creature to have 
would be given appropriate biological and environmental trade-offs. The idea is that locally optimal 
results will tend to be produced by natural selection over long enough periods of time, despite there 
being some obvious exceptions. 
For a concrete example, consider the Wang, Dykhuizen, & Slobodkin model (hereafter WDS 
model). The WDS model was created to help understand and predict the life cycle of a lytic 
bacteriophage (Wang et al. 1996). A bacteriophage is a virus which infects bacterial cells and reproduces 
by bursting from the infected cell into the environment in order to infect others. The original host cell is 
destroyed in this reproductive process. The WDS model characterizes the optimal amount of time for a 
bacteriophage to incubate within a cell before reproducing to maximize reproductive success (for details 
and discussion, see: Wang et al. 1996; Bull et al. 2004; Bull 2006; Potochnik 2010). By using the WDS 
model, biologists are able to accurately predict the lysis time of a bacteriophage, as well as identify 
general patterns and constraints that influence lysis timing. As a result, the WDS model satisfies 
explanatory goal (2) and (3). This has led some, like Angela Potochnik (2015) and Collin Rice (2015), to 
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conclude that optimality models like the WDS model provide a good scientific explanation for why a 
given trait occurs in a population (i.e. by identifying what is locally optimal for the organism). 
What is particularly noteworthy about the WDS model, and optimality models more generally, is 
that in order to satisfy these particular explanatory goals, the model must idealize away from most of 
the known genetic mechanisms actually involved in the evolutionary processes. As Bull et al. note, 
“optimality models assume that phenotypes evolve by natural selection largely independently of 
underlying genetic mechanisms” (2004, p.76). Likewise, Rice argues that “optimality models are typically 
so idealized that they provide little (if any) accurate information about any of the causes within the 
model’s target system(s)—even if we consider causes at the ‘macro’ level” (2015, p.601). So in order to 
satisfy explanatory goals (2) and (3), the idealized nature of optimality models means they must trade-
off their ability to satisfy explanatory goal (4). 
However, any attempt to rectify this by including more accurate mechanistic details into the 
model would actually result in a loss of predictive success for the model (for a detailed explanation, see: 
Rice 2015), as well as interfere with our ability to identify and understand the phenomenon (Levins 
1966; Potochnik 2010; Woods & Rosales 2010). As such, satisfying goals (4) would cost us goals (1) and 
(2). 
Others, meanwhile, have argued that by ignoring the relevant causal mechanisms in the 
evolutionary process, optimality models like the WDS model fail to provide explanations (Gould & 
Lewontin 1979; Lewontin 1979, 1989; Schwartz 2002). Lewontin (1979), for example, argues that 
optimality models are a useful heuristic tool, but that in order to provide a true explanation, one needs 
a model that will “predict the evolutionary trajectory of the community [...] on a purely mechanical 
basis” (1979, p. 6). Similarly, Craver (2006) argues that models which do not identify mechanisms and 
merely subsume the phenomenon under a set of generalizations or constraints do not satisfy the 
15 
 
appropriate sorts of scientific goals needed for a good explanation.3 Here again we can see that the crux 
of the dispute regarding the explanatory status of a given model stems from which particular 
explanatory goals the model is able to satisfy. Theorists disagree as to which goals are essential to the 
explanation, and thus which trade-offs are acceptable and which are not. 
 While I have focused my attention on two particular types of models in this section, the fact that 
models must make trade-offs between different explanatory goals is not a feature unique to dynamical 
or optimality models, nor are philosophical dispute regarding the explanatory status of such models. The 
same sorts of debates currently surround the explanatory status of computational models (Chirimuuta 
2014), topological models (Huneman 2010), and statistical models (Eliasmith 2010) for the same reason. 
And so the question becomes, which particular explanatory goals must a model satisfy to provide an 
explanation when trade-offs are inevitable? 
Most philosophers tend to fall into one of two camps. Either they argue that one of the 
explanatory goals will prove essential for all cases of explanation (and thus our ability to explain will 
require it to be satisfied in all instances), or they argue that satisfying any of the explanatory goals may 
be sufficient to count as an explanation given the appropriate pragmatic context. In other words, they 
are either monists or pluralists about explanatory goals. In either case, this provides them a means of 
determining which individual models provide explanations and which do not in a given situation. I 
propose that neither monism nor pluralism best fits with the way in which models are used to explain in 
science. 
 
3. A Defence of Explanatory Holism 
                                                             
3 It should be noted that Craver is not suggesting that a given scientific model will always become better the more 
mechanistic details it includes (see: Craver & Kaplan, under review). The appropriate amount of mechanistic detail 
for a model to employ will vary based on our particular needs. Instead, he argues only that a model must always 
have some variables that map to structural/mechanistic features of the system in order to carry explanatory 
content (which optimality models do not have). A model which satisfies the other explanatory goals but fails to 
identify relevant mechanisms cannot be explanatory. 
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In both examples discussed in Section 2, it is assumed that because an individual model cannot satisfy all 
our explanatory goals simultaneously, that some goals must trump others for the purposes of 
explanation so that one model or another can be deemed the explanation for that phenomenon in that 
context. In other words, it is assumed that there is always some way of determining a clear victor 
between conflicting explanatory goals so as to grant one model or another the status of an explanation. 
This is true for both explanatory monists, and for explanatory pluralists. 
 For the monist, there will be one explanatory goal in particular that must always be satisfied in 
order to achieve a scientific explanation. Craver, for example, argues that while the goals of prediction 
and understanding are undoubtedly important to science, they are not constitutive of explanation. 
Instead, only models that satisfy the goal of identifying causal mechanisms provide information 
sufficient for explanation (Craver 2006; Kaplan & Craver 2011; Piccinini & Craver 2011). The pluralist, on 
the other hand, argues that satisfying any of the explanatory goals may be sufficient for a scientific 
explanation under the appropriate pragmatic conditions. Under certain conditions, a model which 
subsumes the phenomenon under a general pattern will count as explanatory; under different 
conditions a model which identifies physical mechanisms will count as explanatory, etc.4 
 I propose that both the monist and the pluralist are mistaken. In both cases, it is assumed that 
there is a particular explanatory goal that a model needs to satisfy in order to count as an explanation in 
a given context or situation. The disagreement lies in whether this explanatory goal is invariant across all 
explanatory contexts, or whether it changes depending on pragmatic considerations. The problem with 
both of these options is that they tend to ignore the explanatory interdependence that exists between 
the different scientific goals. 
                                                             
4
 It is worth noting that the term “explanatory pluralism” is not always used consistently throughout the 
philosophy of science literature. As such, this pragmatic contextualist interpretation of explanatory pluralism may 
not correctly describe all those who self-identify as pluralists. For the sake of clarity, I have in mind here the sort of 
explanatory pluralism advocated by the likes of Chemero & Silberstein 2008, and Chirimuuta 2015 (among others).  
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Instead of one goal being given explanatory priority over others in a given context, the different 
goals are deeply dependent on one another for their explanatory power. In other words, the 
explanatory power of each goal stems, at least in part, from the fact that it helps us to more easily 
satisfy the others. Thus any model that sacrifices or trades-off some explanatory goals in favour of 
others will always necessarily undermine its own explanatory power by doing so. 
To illustrate, recall the justification for the claim that dynamical models like the Fitzhugh-
Nagumo model provide scientific explanations. Such models are intended to capture general patterns or 
principles that the explanandum phenomenon adheres to. In other words, it satisfies explanatory goal 
(3). Yet, the main reason why this goal is considered explanatory in the study of the action potential is 
because, by identifying the dynamic principles that guide the system, we are able to gain a better 
understanding of its overall behaviour than can be gained from models which include additional 
mechanistic details (Fitzhugh 1960; Ross 2015). Thus, the explanatory justification for satisfying goal (3) 
is that it is the most effective way to help us satisfy goal (1). But imagine if the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model 
failed to provide us with any understanding of the action potential’s behaviour. In such a case, the claim 
that the model provides a good scientific explanation loses much of its force. In fact, recent studies have 
shown that practicing scientists are unlikely to consider such models explanatory if they are unable to 
provide understanding (Braverman et al. 2012; Waskan et al. 2014a, 2014b; Waskan et al. 2014). In a set 
of experiments conducted by Waskan et al. (2014),  
 
We found that participants were less likely to regard a model as an explanation in the 
Potentially Intelligible and Never Intelligible conditions than in the Intelligible condition, this 
despite the fact that the models in question were said to have other major theoretical virtues 
(e.g., predictive power and fit with surrounding theories). (2014, p.1025) 
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Here, satisfying goal (3) is explanatory because it helps us to more easily satisfy goal (1). If the model 
were thus to satisfy explanatory goal (3) at the cost of satisfying explanatory goal (1), then it would 
undermine its own explanatory power in the process. 
Others, meanwhile, have argued that models which satisfy goal (3) are explanatory because they 
help us to predict the explanandum phenomenon, thereby satisfying explanatory goal (2) (Chemero & 
Silberstein 2008. See also: Chirimuuta 2014, p.140). Subsuming the phenomenon under a general 
regularity or pattern, or identifying principles that govern the system’s behaviour, is informative 
precisely because it allows us to predict how the system is likely to behave in different situations. In fact, 
psychological studies have shown that the very reason we psychologically subsume phenomena under 
generalizations when providing explanations is because it allows us to extrapolate from those 
generalizations to solve problems in novel situations. Lombrozo and Carey, for instance, conducted a 
number of experiments showing that “a psychological function of explanation [in the sense of 
conforming to a predictable pattern] is to highlight information likely to subserve future prediction and 
intervention” (2006, p.167). Consider: if the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model claimed to identify time-voltage 
dependencies of the action potential, but failed to accurately predict any such dependencies in all the 
neurons studied, then the explanatory force of the model becomes undone. Thus the model would 
undermine its own explanatory force by satisfying (3) at the cost of (2).  
Interestingly, the goal of prediction is also thought to be explanatory by many scientists because 
it is an essential tool in helping us to satisfy the explanatory goal of identifying mechanisms. Models 
which predict the occurrence of the phenomenon are often treated as explanatory in part because they 
put essential constraints on the sorts of mechanisms that are capable of fitting with those predictions, 
and thus play an essential role in their discovery (see: Piccinini 2015; Piccinini & Craver 2011; Hochstein 
2016a, 2016b). Yet, ironically, it has also been argued that part of what makes the identification of 
mechanisms explanatory is the very fact that knowing the mechanisms of the system allows us to better 
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predict what the occurrence of the phenomenon will be under various interventions, and in counter-
factual situations (see: Woodward 2000, 2003; Craver 2006). In this respect, a model that identifies 
mechanisms is partially explanatory because it allows us to better predict the behaviour of the system, 
and a model which is predictive is partially explanatory because it allows us to better identify the 
mechanisms of the system. 
Likewise, the identification of mechanisms is frequently considered to be explanatory because it 
helps us to satisfy the goal of intervention, control, and reproduction of the phenomenon. As Eliasmith 
notes: 
 
In the case of cognitive and brain sciences, useful explanations are those that appeal to 
subpersonal mechanisms. This is because it is precisely such explanations which provide a basis 
for both intervention in behaviour and the artificial reproduction of those behaviours. These 
mechanisms must be specific enough to allow for intervention. That is, the mechanisms must be 
specified in a way that relates to the measurable and manipulable properties of the system. 
(2010, p.316) 
 
Craver makes a similar argument, noting that models which identify mechanisms have greater 
explanatory power than other models because they “are much more useful than merely phenomenal 
models for the purposes of control and manipulation” (2006, p.358). In other words, the explanatory 
force of goal (4) comes from the fact that satisfying it helps us to more easily satisfy explanatory goal (5). 
This idea is likewise supported by evidence from numerous studies in developmental psychology and 
comparative psychology that have shown that we view the identification of causal mechanisms as 
explanatory because “once we represent the causal relations among ourselves, our conspecifics and 
objects, we can intervene in a much wider variety of ways to get a particular result.” (Gopnik 2000, 
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p.303). And so if a model allowed us to identify mechanisms, but failed to give us information needed 
for such interventions, then its explanatory force is likewise undercut. 
This, however, does not mean that explanatory goal (5) is intrinsically explanatory by itself 
either. Our ability to manipulate, control, and reproduce phenomena is frequently thought to be 
explanatory because it helps us to understand the explanandum phenomenon (see: Dretske 1994). In 
other words, explanatory goal (5) is explanatory in part because satisfying it helps to satisfy explanatory 
goal (1). Cases where such models fail to provide understanding are typically not considered explanatory 
by practicing scientists (Braverman et al. 2012).  
 To complicate matters even further, the explanatory goal of understanding is itself often only 
considered explanatory because it is a sign that we have satisfied many of our other explanatory goals. 
Hempel, for instance, thought that “understanding why an outcome occurs is a matter of seeing that it 
was to be expected on the basis of a law.” (Woodward 2017). Wesley Salmon argued that “to 
understand why certain things happen, we need to see how they are produced by [causal] mechanisms” 
(Salmon 1984, p.132). Others, meanwhile, have proposed that to understand a phenomenon requires 
being able to control and reproduce it. The physicist Richard Feynman, for example, famously stated 
“that which I cannot create, I do not understand” (Eliasmith & Trujillo 2014, p.1). In this regard, 
explanatory goal (1) is thought to have explanatory power because it is a sign that we have satisfied 
explanatory goals such as (2), (4), or (5).5 It is not hard to see why this is the case. After all, to claim that 
a model provides us with an understanding of a given phenomenon, but which fails to provide any 
                                                             
5 One might object that this simply reflects an ambiguity in the term “understanding” as opposed to any deeper 
claim regarding the interdependence between the goal of understanding and the other explanatory goals (special 
thanks to a blind referee for pointing out this worry). While constraints on space limit my ability to address this 
problem at length here, it should be sufficient for my purpose to highlight the fact that almost every definition of 
understanding involves some sort of cognitive component in which the target phenomenon is made intelligible to 
the inquirer (for psychological studies that support this, see: Keil 2006; Braverman et. al 2012; Waskan et. al 2014. 
See also: Potochnik 2015). This very minimal shared criterion of “understanding” is sufficient to show the 
interdependence between it and the other goals, as each of the other goals has been defended as essential for 
explanation on the grounds that the psychological intelligibility of the phenomenon is contingent on their 
attainment. That being said, this point is still contentious and may deserve greater exploration. 
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insights into how the phenomenon is produced, when or where the phenomenon occurs, or how to 
reproduce or intervene in it, calls into question what it even means to claim that we have an 
understanding of it at all. 
 Indeed, any explanatory goal that is satisfied in isolation of the others runs into a similar 
problem. A model that allows us to predict the phenomenon, but which provides us with no 
understanding of it, does not identify any principles or constraints that influence its behaviour, identifies 
no underlying causes for it, and provides no insight into how to manipulate, control or reproduce it, is 
typically not treated as explanatory (Keil 2006; Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, 2009; Braverman et al. 
2012). 
 Or consider models which identify mechanisms. A model which identifies a mechanism, but fails 
to provide any understanding of how it works, cannot accurately predict its resulting behaviour, does 
not identify any general principles or constraints on its behaviour, and does not allow us to intervene in 
its workings, is typically not considered explanatory even by mechanists. This is because one of the 
primary guides for determining if we have successfully identified the proper causal mechanism, and thus 
provided an explanation, is whether our mechanistic account lets us accurately predict the phenomenon 
(Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000), understand it (Glennan 2002), or manipulate it (Craver 2006; 
Bechtel 2008). A mechanistic model which fails to do any of these things is taken to have failed as an 
explanation. 
 What all this shows is that forcing us to choose between explanatory goals is explanatorily 
detrimental, as each goal in isolation fails to explain without the others. The different explanatory goals 
support one another, since their explanatory value is partially defined in terms of their relationship to 
one another. Moreover, the more explanatory goals we can satisfy, the easier it becomes to satisfy the 
others given their interconnected nature. Thus instead of an explanatory pluralism or an explanatory 
monism, what we have instead is an explanatory holism; one where the goals of explanation reinforce 
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and depend on one another, and cannot be cut off from one another without undermining their 
explanatory power in the process. As such, the nature of explanation may simply not allow us to 
adjudicate between the different explanatory goals, since it is their very interdependence that makes 
them explanatory. 
 Thus we are now left with a problem. If the different explanatory goals depend on one another 
for their explanatory power, then any model which satisfies one goal at the cost of others will inevitably 
cut that goal off from the very things that make it explanatory. The irony of this is that the essential 
trade-offs that individual models must make in order to gain a degree of explanatory power by satisfying 
certain goals at the cost of others undermines the very explanatory power of those goals in the process. 
For example, if what makes the goal of identifying causal mechanisms explanatory is that it allows us to 
better predict the phenomenon of interest, or that it provides information needed to intervene in the 
workings of the system, then a model which can only identify mechanisms by sacrificing its ability to 
predict the phenomenon and intervene in its workings undermines the very reason for considered that 
goal explanatory in the first place.6 
 This means that we cannot grant priority to any one explanatory goal over another, since their 
interconnected nature is essential to their explanatory status. This is not to say that we never have good 
reasons for prioritizing one sort of scientific goal over another for other sorts of scientific reasons of 
course. Scientists rightfully care about things other than just explanation. A medical professional who 
cares about treating a patient may wish to use a model that allows them to control and manipulate the 
phenomenon over one that identifies abstract principles that the phenomenon obeys, since that is best 
suited for the task of treatment. However, the fact that we have good reason to prioritize one goal over 
                                                             
6 For a straightforward example of this sort of model, consider the use of large scale graph-based models to 
characterize certain organizational features of complex biological mechanisms. Such models are often necessary 
for representing organizational features like complex feedback loop, but can only do so by idealizing away from 
many of the structural and behavioural features of the system needed for both manipulation and prediction (for 
details and discussion, see Bechtel 2015). 
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another for a given scientific purpose does not mean that such a goal is therefore more integral to the 
very nature of scientific explanation than the others. We must be careful not to confuse prioritizations of 
goals for different pragmatic purposes with an explanatory prioritization of one goal over another. The 
fact that we sometimes care more about one goal over others does not ipso facto show that satisfying 
the goal is thereby more explanatory than satisfying others.7 Given the interdependent nature of the 
explanatory goals, the assumption of explanatory prioritization is self-undermining. 
With this in mind, let us return to the question of whether the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model and the 
WDS model count as good scientific explanations. Philosophers on both sides of these debates assume 
that there is some set of criteria we can appeal to in order to determine if the model definitely does or 
does not provide an explanation. Yet, this assumes that an individual model has the ability to satisfy not 
only a particular explanatory goal, but also all the other goals needed for sustaining that goal’s 
explanatory power. Yet, given the necessary explanatory trade-offs that each model must make, this is 
simply not possible. Neither the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model nor the WDS model can satisfy all the goals 
that are needed to grant either one of them explanatory power. Yet this will inevitably be the case with 
any individual scientific model we employ. 
The mistake being made is the assumption that scientific explanations must be provided by 
individual models. To ask whether a given model provides an explanation is to assume that the 
explanation can be contained in, or conveyed by, a single model or representation. If we reject this 
claim, then we can interpret our explanatory practices in a way which dissolves these philosophical 
disputes. Scientists rarely, if ever, point to a single model as being the explanation of a given 
phenomenon. Instead, they appeal to many different models when engaging in the act of explaining a 
complex phenomenon (for numerous examples, see: Trumpler 1997; Mitchell 2003; Weisberg 2013, 
p.103; Hochstein 2016a; Miłkowski 2016). Once we give up the idea that explanations must be provided 
                                                             
7 Thanks to Natalia Washington for encouraging me to emphasize this distinction. 
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by individual representations, then the holistic nature of explanation and the trade-offs made by 
individual models becomes reconcilable. 
As noted above, the explanatory interdependence between the different goals means that 
satisfying one explanatory goal allows us to more easily satisfy others. This means that even though 
individual models must sacrifice their ability to satisfy some goals in order to successfully satisfy others, 
the information we gain from a model can be used to help us construct other models which satisfy other 
goals that the initial model had to trade off. This in turn generates information which can be used to 
build even more models which satisfy even more explanatory goals, and to refine previous models in 
light of the new goal being satisfied. The more models we develop which satisfy different explanatory 
goals, the more our entire collection of models becomes explanatory by allowing us to satisfy the entire 
interconnected set. As a result, scientific explanations are distributed across sets of different models 
which satisfy different goals, and in doing so help to improve the explanatory power of one another. 
This explanatory interdependence can be seen clearly when we observe how models like the Fitzhugh-
Nagumo model and the WDS model influence, and are influenced by, the construction of other scientific 
models which satisfy distinct explanatory goals. 
Consider the WDS model. In order for the WDS model to accurately account for the 
bacteriophage reproductive cycle, particular mechanisms in the evolutionary processes must be present 
and active, while other potentially disruptive factors must be absent. Knowing these mechanistic details 
tells us when and how to apply the optimality model, even if the inclusion of this information into the 
model itself may inhibit its ability to work properly. As Potochnik notes: 
 
Because optimality models use highly simplified assumptions as placeholders for complex 
 dynamics, their successful use depends upon evolutionary dynamics that the models themselves 
 do not explicitly represent. In other words, optimality models are epistemically dependent on 
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 unrepresented dynamics. Information about these unrepresented dynamics helps establish 
 whether an optimality model’s simplifying assumptions are problematic, and thus how 
 successful the model is. 
 
Genetic constraints are a prime example of how unrepresented dynamics can have 
 unanticipated effects on evolution. Genetic transmission can involve a host of complications, 
 such as epistasis (different genes with interacting effects) and pleiotropy (one gene with 
 different unrelated effects). Such complicating factors may cause an evolutionary outcome to 
 deviate widely from an optimality model’s predictions. For this reason, optimality models are 
 epistemically dependent on unrepresented features of genetic transmission. (2010, p.226) 
 
In other words, a scientific model which identifies the presence of relevant evolutionary 
mechanisms and potentially disruptive factors provides invaluable information as to whether an 
optimality model will work, and under what conditions. Likewise, if we have a successful optimality 
model, then we can often use this information to determine that certain evolutionary mechanisms must 
be present, while others are absent. If satisfying one explanatory goal helps us to satisfy others, then 
building a scientific model which satisfies one goal will similarly help us to create and apply a different 
model in order to satisfy another. This understanding of scientific explanation does not force us to 
choose between models, but instead acknowledges their explanatory interdependence.8 
                                                             
8 It is worth noting that Potochnik draws a very different conclusion from this interdependence between models 
than I do. While she grants that there is an epistemic interdependence between the different models, she insists 
that optimality model remain explanatorily independent from the other models. She argues that the model which 
identifies the high-level causal pattern is the best explanation for why a particular trait occurs. Other models, like 
those that identify essential evolutionary mechanisms, may be needed to effectively construct and apply an 
optimality model, but it is the optimality model that provides the explanation independently of those models. 
 Yet I propose that this interpretation is incorrect. The mechanistic details are essential to our explanation 
of the phenomenon, since the presence or absence of certain evolutionary mechanisms (such as epistasis and 
pleiotropy) is essential for the phenomenon to display the patterns represented in the optimality model. In other 
words, the explanation as to why the trait appears is not merely because it is locally optimal, it is because it is 
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Take the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model. While the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model itself does not directly 
describe the underlying mechanisms of any particular action potential, it provides essential constraints 
needed in the discovery and understanding of those mechanisms. Not any kind of mechanism will be 
successfully characterized by the time and voltage dependencies that the Fitzhugh-Nagumo model 
describes. As such, identifying these dependencies allowed scientists in the 1960s and 70s to use them 
as a guide for discovering the possible mechanisms responsible for them. This was not a one-way street 
either. Learning more about the underlying mechanisms of the action potential similarly allowed 
scientists to further refine and improve upon the regularities previously described, and to develop more 
accurate representations of them (for details and discussion, see: Trumpler 1997; Hochstein 2016a). In 
this respect, a model which satisfied one explanatory goal provided essential information that helped to 
guide the creation of other models used to satisfy others. 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
locally optimal in virtue of the presence or absence of certain key mechanistic facts. These facts are part of the 
explanation as to why the trait occurs as it does, and are only identified by the mechanistic model, not the 
optimality model.  Thus the mechanistic model not only provides context for the optimality model, it provides 
relevant explanatory information as to why the optimal trait occurs. And so to suggest that the optimality model’s 
explanatory power is independent of the mechanistic model is extremely misleading.  
What appears prima facie to be a case of explanatory independence is instead a case in which our 
pragmatic interests shift our attention from one model to another.  This shift in attention should not be confused 
with a shift in explanatory content however. Once the mechanistic model is used to identifying the relevant 
evolutionary mechanisms, we shift our focus to the optimality model in order to satisfy explanatory goals that our 
mechanistic model could not provide.  It only appears like the optimality model is explanatorily independent from 
the mechanistic model because it seems like the explanatory content is only available to us once we have the 
optimality model in hand, and not when we have the mechanistic model. But this perception is deceptive, since in 
order to generate the optimality model we must already have available to us the information from the mechanistic 
model.  So by the time we apply the optimality model, the explanatory information available to us is being 
conveyed by both the mechanistic and optimality models together. It only seems like the optimality model is 
providing an independent explanation because the mechanistic information has been pushed into the background 
as we focus our attention on the optimality model, and so appears invisible.  But it is only when the information 
from our optimality model is used to supplement the information from our mechanistic model that we begin to 
generate an explanation. The explanatory contents of the models are not independent, but deeply dependent on 
one another. 
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So what must a scientific model do in order to provide a good scientific explanation? In this paper, I have 
argued that this very question presupposes that individual models have greater representational powers 
than they in fact do. Individual models can provide information needed to satisfy some of the goals 
thought to be constitutive of explanation, but only by undermining their explanatory power in the 
process. And so when forced to choose between individual scientific models, there can be no 
explanatory victors. Instead, we must appeal to collections of models in our explanatory practices. 
Collections of models provide an explanation when they satisfy the web of interconnected goals that 
justify the explanatory power of one another. In this regard, many current disputes in the philosophy of 
science regarding which sorts of models provide explanations, and which do not, are misguided. They 
implicitly assume that explanations must be provided by individual models. By abandoning this idea, we 
can better understand and reconcile the interconnected nature of our different explanatory goals, as 
well as the necessary trade-offs that our different models must make. 
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